COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY)	
	<u> </u>	CASE NO.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF COMMISSION)	94-417
REGULATION 807 KAR 5:006, SECTION 24)	

ORDER

Kentucky Power Company ("Kentucky Power"), a Kentucky corporation which engages in the distribution of electricity to the public for compensation for lights, heat, power, or other uses, is a utility subject to Commission jurisdiction. KRS 278.010(3)(a).

KRS 278.280(2) directs the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations for the performance of services by utilities. Pursuant to this statutory directive, the Commission promulgated Commission Regulation 807 KAR 5:006, Section 24, which requires a utility to adopt and execute a safety program.

Commission Staff has submitted to the Commission an Electrical Utility Accident Investigation Report dated June 28, 1994, appended hereto, which alleges:

- 1. On May 15, 1994, Ronnie Oney, Gary Hartman, Michael Rowh, Eric Jackson, and Russell Modesitt, employees of Master Mechanical Insulation, were injured as a result of a sulfur dioxide release at Kentucky Power's Big Sandy Generating Station in Louisa, Kentucky.
- 2. The sulfur dioxide release occurred as a result of an equipment failure.

- 3. At the time of the incident, Kentucky Power failed to follow its internal procedures for the unloading of sulfur dioxide. These procedures required that all doorways and windows remain closed during sulfur dioxide unloading. At the time of the incident, one door and several windows were not closed.
- 4. As a result of Kentucky Power's failure to comply with its internal procedures on May 15, 1994, Kentucky Power is in probable violation of Commission Regulation 807 KAR 5:006, Section 24.
- 5. The sulfur dioxide system is hazardous to the Big Sandy Generating Plant's operation and personnel. In the event of a significant sulfur dioxide release, the system's design and location prevent the isolation of the release and thus increase the plant personnel's risk of exposure.

Based on its review of the Electrical Utility Accident Investigation Report and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Commission finds that <u>prima facie</u> evidence exists that Kentucky Power has failed to comply with Commission Regulation 807 KAR 5:006, Section 24, and that the sulfur dioxide system at its Big Sandy Generating Plant constitutes an unsafe practice.

The Commission, on its own motion, HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. Kentucky Power shall appear before the Commission on February 15, 1995, at 10:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, in Hearing Room 1 of the Commission's offices at 730 Schenkel Lane, Frankfort, Kentucky, for the purpose of presenting evidence concerning the alleged violation of Commission Regulation 807 KAR 5:006, Section

24, and of showing cause why it should not be subject to the penalties prescribed in KRS 278.990(1) for its alleged violation.

2. At the scheduled hearing, Kentucky Power shall also present evidence on the safety and reliability of the sulfur dioxide system used at its Big Sandy Generating Plant.

3. Kentucky Power shall submit to the Commission, within 20 days of the date of this Order, a written response to the allegations contained in the Electrical Utility Accident Investigation Report.

4. The Electrical Utility Accident Investigation Report of June 28, 1994, a copy of which is appended hereto, is made part of the record of this proceeding.

5. Any motion requesting any informal conference with Commission Staff to consider any matter which would aid in the handling or disposition of this proceeding shall be filed with the Commission no later than 20 days from the date of this Order.

Done at Frankfort, Kentucky, this 22nd day of November, 1994.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

ATTEST:

Executive Director

ELECTRICAL UTILITY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

DATE OF THIS REPORT 6-28-94 SUBMITTED BY Fuad Sharifi and
Elie El-Rouaiheb
NAME OF UTILITY Kentucky Power Company
ACCIDENT REPORTED BY Tim Ohlinger
DATE ACCIDENT OCCURRED 5-15-94 at 10:12 A.M.
DATE & TIME UTILITY LEARNED OF ACCIDENT 5-15-94 at 10:12 A.M.
DATE & TIME ACCIDENT REPORTED 5-15-94 at 12:02 P.M.
DATE OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 5-16-94
DATE SUMMARY WRITTEN REPORT WAS RECEIVED FROM UTILITY 5-20-94
PERSONS ASSISTING IN THE INVESTIGATION Timothy L. Ohlinger of
Kentucky Power Company.
NAME OF VICTIM(S) 1. Ronnie Oney, Gary Hartman, Michael Rowh,
Eric Jackson and Russell Modesitt.
FATAL No NAME OF EMPLOYER Master Mechanical Insulation
INJURIES Respiratory Irritation
LOCATION OF ACCIDENT SITE Kentucky Power Company - Big Sandy Plant
P. O. Box 400, Louisa, KY 41230

BACKGROUND

Kentucky Power Company, Big Sandy Plant ("Plant") operates two coal-fired power generation units. Each unit has an electrostatic precipitator to reduce the particulates (ash) emitted to the atmosphere to meet the air pollution regulations. Sulfur trioxide

(SO₃) is injected into the flue gas of each unit as a conditioning agent to increase the efficiency of the precipitators.

Sulfur trioxide is produced in the Plant from sulfur dioxide (SO_2) by oxidizing the latter in two reactors on a vanadium pentaoxide bed. SO_3 is then injected into the flue gas of the boilers.

Sulfur dioxide is purchased from out of state and is transported to the Plant in a liquid form under pressure on 3,500 gallon trucks. The Plant consumes about one truckload every week.

The Plant operates two identical SO₂ systems—one system for each power generation unit. Each SO₂ system consists of a 15,000 gallon high pressure carbon steel storage tank, a stainless steel piping network, and ancillary equipment. Only system No. 1 has truck unloading facilities. SO₂ is transferred from system No. 1 to system No. 2 by a portable compressor. System No. 2 is provided with two pumps to transfer SO₂ to the converter unit at an elevated level. The unloading of liquid SO₂ from the truck to the storage tank of system No. 1 is performed as follows:

The pressure in the tank of the truck and the storage tank in the SO_2 system is about 80--100 psi. A one-inch vapor line from the storage tank will be connected to a compressor located on the truck which draws SO_2 vapor from the storage tank, compresses it, and injects it into the truck tank so that the pressure on the truck tank will be about 20 psi higher than the pressure on the storage tank. Prior to unloading liquid SO_2 , a leak test is performed on the 1 1/2" stainless steel unloading liquid lines. A 1 1/2"

reinforced flexible hose is connected from the truck to the unloading SO₂ line. The hose has a valve at each end which is actuated electrically to an on/off position, then the valves are opened to unload the truck. The unloading takes about 4 hours. A 1 1/2" sight flow is located in the unloading line. The sight flow consists of a stainless steel body with a high pressure sight glass which is sealed by a gasket and a screwed fitting made of bronze. The sight glass is used by the operator as an indicator for the flow of the liquid SO₂ from the truckload to the storage tank.

THE ACCIDENT

The accident was due to the failure in the sight-flow. The bronze screwed fitting popped out during the transfer of SO₂ from the truckload to the storage tank, and liquid SO₂ released from the sight flow into the atmosphere and into the building where the injured employees of the contractor were working at that time. At least one door to the building, as well as windows, were left open during the SO₂ unloading.

FINDINGS

1. The sulfur dioxide systems in the Plant are located on both sides of a private road between the two generation units. Any serious accident in any one of the two SO₂ storage tanks could affect the operation of the Plant and could jeopardize the safety of the employees. Staff believes that the SO₂ systems were not part of the original Plant design. Staff is of the opinion that since the air pollution regulations were tightened, the precipitators were too small for the two generators, and the

injection of SO_3 was needed to increase the efficiency of the precipitators which is more economical than replacing the precipitators by larger ones.

- 2. The sulfur dioxide systems are operated by several departments, loaded by the Laboratory Staff, operated by the Engineering Staff, maintained by the Maintenance Group, and observed by the Safety Group. Staff noticed the equipment was neglected, and corrosion was obvious on the pumps and valve handles.
- 3. The safety instruments were adequate. The piping network was made of stainless steel with remote controlled shut-off valves, a differential pressure shut-off valve, and a series of quick on/off ball valves along the 1 1/2" unloading line.
- 4. A compressor for unloading the rail tanks was removed but the piping system was left in place.
- 5. Adequate safety instructions were given to the operators for the loading and unloading process. Adequate safety products were provided to the operators.
- 6. The flow sight was made of stainless steel, but was covered by a screw-on bronze cap. Gaskets were replaced upon failure, which occurred about every 6 months. The bronze screwed fitting had worn out and could have been corroded by SO₂ leaks. The Plant will replace the screw-on fitting with a flanged fitting to prevent a similar accident.

PROBABLE VIOLATIONS OF COMMISSION REGULATIONS

There was one probable violation of Commission Regulations involved in this accident. One door was left wide open during SO₂ unloading, resulting in a probable violation of 807 KAR 5:006, Section 24, since Kentucky Power's SO₂ unloading procedures require that doorways, especially roll-up doors, remain closed during SO₂ unloading.

RECOMMENDATION

Staff is of the opinion that the SO₂ system is hazardous to the Plant and its personnel because the systems cannot be isolated in case of a serious accident in the vicinity of the systems.

It is recommended Kentucky Power perform a feasibility study on alternative systems to generate SO₂ from nonhazardous material that could be produced in a confined and well-designed system. A package unit consisting of a sulfur burner to convert sulfur to SO₂ and then convert it to SO₃ could be a safer alternative. About 600 gallons per day of liquid SO₂ is used currently by the Plant which is equivalent to burning about 3,500 lbs/day of sulfur. That is, a sulfur burner capacity of 150 lbs/hr. provides the SO₂ gas needed for the current capacity for the two power generation units.

600 gallons $SO_2 \times 11.65$ lbs./gallon = 6,990 lbs SO_2 per day or approximately 7,000 lbs SO_2 per day

$$S + O_2 ---> SO_2$$

32 lbs. + 32 lbs. ---> 64 lbs.

$$S = \frac{32}{64} \times 7,000 = 3,500$$
 lbs/day sulfur = 150 lbs/hr.

Further, it is recommended that the Commission require Kentucky Power to show cause why it should not be penalized pursuant to KRS 278.990, due to Kentucky Power's probable violations of Commission Regulation 807 KAR 5:006, Section 24.

ATTACHMENT B



FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY BIG SANDY PLANT P. O. BOX 400 LOUISA, XX 41230

TO. Martha Morton DATE SENT!	5-20-94
COMPANY: Public Service Commission	
ECCATION: Grank fort, Ly	
FAX PHONE NUMBER: (502) 564-7279	
FROM: Dim Chlinge, Human Resources	Sujev.
KPC/BIG SANDY PLANT FAX PHONE NO. 606-686-2415 Ext. 1118	
NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW COVER SHEET: 23	
ANY PROBLEMS WITH TRANSMISSION CALL: 606-686-2415 Ext. 1116	
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:	

Big Sandy Plant P. O. Box 400 Louisa, KY 41230-0400 606-686-2415

Commonwealth of Kentucky Public Service Commission 730 Schenekel Lane P.O. Box 615 Frankfort, KY 40602

Attn: Ms. Martha Morton



MAY 23 1994

DIVISION OF UTILITY ENGINEERING & SERVICES

May 20, 1994

Dear Ms. Morton:

Enclosed is the information requested pertaining to the recent SO_2 leak at Big Sandy Plant. Should you have any questions, please feel free to call.

Sincerely,

Timothy L. Ohlinger

Human Resources Supervisor

D. L. Ohlinger/us

TLO:bs

XY-373 REV. 4/91

KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY ACCIDENT SUMMARY REPORT

THTTD PR	NAME	 	AGE
INJURED PERSON:	See Attachment A		<u>'</u>
	ADDRESS		PHONE NUMBERS: RONE:
	OCCUPATION	EMPLOYED BY	
TIME &	DATE & TIME OF LOSS OR ACCIDENT 05/15/94 10:12 AM X PM	LOCATION Louisa, KY	Big Sandy Plant
Personal Injury	NATURE & EXTENT OF INJURY See Attachment A		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
•	WHERE WAS INJURED TAKEN AFTER ACCI	CD SAVE	NAME OF DOCTOR
PROPERTY DAMAGE:	CWNER Kentucky Power Company - Big Sandy ADDRESS	Plant	PHONE NUMBERS: HONE: BUS: (606) 686-2415
	P.O. Box 400 Louisa, KY 41230 LIST DAMAGE Rotameter - Site Flow Indicator		S 700.00
		DYCTEMEDYCEED	
WITHESES:	OBTAIN THE MANHS AND ADDRESSES OF ANYTHING ABOUT THE OCCURRENCE INC. POLICE AUTHORITY TO WHOM THE ACCI.	LUDING DATE, B	ADGE RO. OR HARB OF
IT IS IK- PORTANT TO	MANK John L. Skaggs - Performance Technici		PHONE NUMBERS: HOME: (606) 297-1837 BUS: (606) 686-2415
CIVE FULL EARE & ADDRESS OF EVERY	P.O. Box 66 Lomansville, KY 41232 NAME Chuck R. Stapleton - Performance Tech ADDRESS	nician BSP	PROME NUMBERS: HOME: (606) 329-0086 BUS: (606) 686-2415
WITMESS	3214 Park Street Ashland, KY 41101		PRONE NUMBERS: HOME: BUS:
	ADDRESS		1
DESCRIP- TION OF ACCIDENT:	Rotameter (site flow indicator) faile 10:12 a.m. Sunday, May 15, 1994. The glass and two gaskets inside the hous transferred from a tanker truck to the checked for leaks prior to the unload was not over pressurized. This was the being used. See Accident Investigati details.	retaining ring sing failed while te plant's SO ₂ te ling and none were te proper applica	which secures the site the liquid SO ₂ was being ank. The system was re detected. The system ation for the rotameter
	TT IS IMPORTANT THAT ANY ARTICLE, OCCURRENCE BE CAREFULLY PRESERVES DATE May 19, 1994 SIGNATUR Other information provided as request Attachment D - SO ₂ notification lette Attachment E - SO ₂ unloading procedur Attachment F - SO ₂ supplier Attachment G - Job orders compelted	ged includes: er of unloading :	Tim Ohlinger Human Resources Superviso from laboratory supervisor
	Attachment H - Operator's daily inspe		

ATTACHMENT A

SO2 INCIDENT

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Master Mechanical Insulation 912 5th Street W. Huntington, West Virginia 25701 (304) 522-6160

Injured

Ronnie Oney
Route 1 Box 191C
Webbville, Kentucky 41180
(606) 738-6796
Age: 38
Occupation: Laborer

Admitted to Cabell-Huntington Hospital for acute respiratory distress. Fair condition.

Gary Hartman
912 Vallance Street
Flatwoods, Kentuckky 41139
(606) 474-6529
Age: 39

Occupation: Laborer

Admitted to Three Rivers Medical Center for observation. Precautionary measure only. Released May 16 at 7:00 p.m.

Evaluated

Timothy Day

Evaluated and released at Three Rivers Medical Center

Pederal Industrial Services, Inc. 12980 Inkster Road Redford, Michigan 48239 (313) 533-9888

Injured

Michael Rowh
Route 9 Box 2
Parkersburg, West Virginia 26101

(304) 428-4667

Age: 39

Occupation: Vice President

Eric Jackson 4106 9th Avenue Parkersburg, West Virginia 26101

(304) 485-5312

Age: 26

Occupation: Laborer

Russell Modesitt
Route 9 Box 286F
Parkersburg, West Virginia 26101

(304) 485-9817

Age: 33

Occupation: Laborer

Admitted to Three Rivers Medical Center for observation. Precautionary measure only. Released May 16 at 3:20 p.m.

Treated and released at Three Rivers Medical Center for minor respiratory irritation.

Treated and released at Three Rivers Medical Center for minor respiratory irritation.

Evaluated

Robert Burch Evaluated and released at Three Rivers

Medical Center.

Daniel Jackson Evaluated and released at Three Rivers

Medical Center.

Cecil McElfresh Evaluated and released at Three Rivers

Medical Center.

Brian McElfresh Evaluated and released at Three Rivers

Medical Center.

Randy Walkins Evaluated and released at Three Rivers

Medical Center.

Three River Medical Center Hwy. 644 Louisa, KY 41230 (606) 638-1200

Treating Physician - Dr. DiGiulio

Cabell Huntington Hospital 1340 Hal Greer Blvd. Huntington, WV 25701 (304) 526-2000

Treating Physician - Dr. Ottaviano

KENTUCKY	POWER		COMPANY
		 	COMPAN

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

	PART	1			
Kentucky Power Company, Big Sandy Plant SO2 release	ne 05-15-94	Age	Sex	S.S. #·.	
sandication Contract personne	1 (See attachment 1	.) .			
ow Long in Classification			 		· ·
ow Long In Department		Da	te of Emplo	yment	
	PART	11			
Accident Cia	essification and Type	(Check All A	pplicable l	Boxes)	
Fatality	Electrical (Contact		First Aid	
Lost Workday	Electrical I	Flash		Near Miss	
Restricted Activity	Medical C	280		Vehicle Acc	ident
eather Conditions Mostly clo	udy				
ate Accident Reported 05-15-94	To W	hom Approp	riate age	ncies	·
/here did Accident Occur? (Be specif	ic; i.e., overhead line, p	ower plant, etc	c.; if Inside (plant, give locatio	n)
Unit 1 Sulfur Dioxide Unload	ling Station			·	
iv_Plant/G.O. Dept_Ky. Power_Co.	. Big Sandy Plant	Town	Louisa		State KY
ames of Witnesses to AccidentJo					
ene Haase					
lame and Classification of Superviso	or in Charge of Work	dichael D. E	Bayes, Per	formance Engir	neer
lob Briefing Conducted By:	Person in Charge of W	ork			
<u> </u>	. Self-Briefing (Previ	ious trainir	ng provide	ed)	

Description of Accident (if Insufficient Space - Continue on the back or an extra sheet) (if Applicable, Attach Sketch)

/ision/Plant/G.O. Dept. Performance - Laboratory Date 05-15-94 Time 10:10 a.m. EDT
10e of Accident Unit 1 Sulfur Dioxide Unloading Station
essification of injured Period of Disability
tent of injuries
escription of Accident On Sunday, May 15, 1994, a Performance Technician A and a Performance
Technician B were overseeing the unloading of sulfur dioxide (SO ₂) at the Unit 1 SO ₂
unloading station. At 10:10 a.m. EDT, and approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes into the
unloading of the first scheduled 802 tanker truck, the technicians heard a noise.
Instantly a white SO ₂ vapor cloud developed in the unloading area. This vapor cloud
appeared to be originating from the liquid 802 flow indicator and was apraying in an
easterly direction toward the tanker trucks. At the time of the release, the wind was
blowing in a northeasterly direction.
After hearing the noise and witnessing the SO ₂ release, the Performance Technician B
donned a full-face SO2 respirator, rubber gloves, and a chemical resistant jacket and
proceeded toward the unloading pad to close the hand-operated shutoff valve located between
the flow indicator and the SO2 storage tank. The Performance Technician A donned a full-
face SO2 respirator and proceeded toward the emergency safety shutoff panel and activated
the switch which closes the automatic SO2 unloading valves. This isolated the upstream
side of the SO ₂ flow indicator. The Performance Technician A then proceeded to the P.A.
located by the passenger elevator on the basement floor of Unit 1 and immediately
contacted the Unit 1 Control Room. He informed them of the SO2 release and instructed
them to activate the emergency evacuation alarm to evacuate all appropriate personnel
from the plant. Within approximately 30 seconds, the failed 502 flow indicator was
isolated and the release was stopped.
As a result of the release, three contractor employees were immediately transported
to Three Rivers Medical Center due to exposure to SO2 vapors. Later, other contract
personnel sought medical evaluation. (See Attachment 1 for details).
Does the investigating Committee feel it has a clear picture of just what caused the accident?XYesNo
'f yes, why did this socident occur? (If No, please explain) Equipment failure. The bronze retaining ring,
which secures the sight glass and two gaskets inside the stainless steel housing,
failed during the unloading process.

ATTACHMENT 1

SO2 INCIDENT

MAY 15, 1994

- 1. Ronnie Oney, MMI, Cabell-Huntington Hospital, Guarded but stable condition
- 2. Gary Hartman, MMI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Admitted for observation (Released 5/16)
- 3. Michael Rowh, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Admitted for observation (Released 5/16)
- 4. Eric Jackson, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Treated and released
- 5. Russell Modesitt, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Treated and released
- 6. Robert Burch, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released
- 7. Timothy Day, MMI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released
- 8. Daniel Jackson, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released
- 9. Cecil McElfresh, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released
- 10. Brian McElfresh, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released
- 11. Randy Walkins, FI, Three Rivers Medical Center, Evaluated and released

- MMI Master Mechanical Insulation, Huntington, West Virginia
- FI Federal Industries, Parkersburg, West Virginia

EUGENE ERNST PRODUCTS CO.



BOX 427 FARMINGDALE, NEW JERSEY 07727-0427 PHONE: (Area Code 201) 938-5641

EEP/ SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS

CONSTRUCTION: Iron, Bronze, Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel


Round Glass Retaining Rings are made in Bronze as they do not come in contact with liquid for IRON, CARBON STEEL AND STAINLESS STEEL BODIES


PRESENT

PROPOSED

ROTATING TEFLON* WHEEL







MODEL NO. EEP 300-S

WHEN ORDERING: SPECIFY THE EEP/MODEL NUMBER

*DuPont's Registered Trademark

AND CONSTRUCTION

Pipe		DIMENSIONS	, ,	Approx.
Size	A	8	C	Weight
1(83/2-)	به والد 3٠ ر. ٠	73.2	7/8"	1,1/201
1/4**	-63- CF	2"	/ 7/8" · :	1-1720
3/8	E3 1464	Z+2	. 7/8"	· · 1-1/2#
17277 V.	. 3-3/4 ≯>	2-3/4	1-1/4"	3# *
3/47	: 3:33/A7X	97.23/47	.: 1-1/4"	317
THE LEGIL OF	1 14 4 1/4 2004	11.73 1/2 A	65-1-1/2"/	7.4# A
A.1.14	公5-1/24%	3-4-1/2 gr	- بنا 2-3/8	. 80 en inte
€1,172 7.₩	57553/275	MA 41/22 2	7: 23/8:2	9174.4
7.277 La	, =16-1/4".±.		2.7/8">	17,0 1, 3

SCREWED ENDS

EEP 300-S Sight Flow indicators operate successfully in any position but are particularly adapted to pipe lines carrying dark opaque solutions where the motion of the wheel is easily detected. This model is equally adapted to transparent solutions and gases and is frequently installed where observation must be made from a distance.

> PRESSURE RATING - 150 PSIG FOR INSERTION INTO PIPE



Illustrates 2" size with flange type glass retaining covers

ADJUSTABLE FACE SPANNER

WRENCHES FOR REMOVING SIGHT FLOW RETAINER RINGS

MODEL NUMBER	482	483	484
Extreme . Capacity .	21		17.70
PIN SIZE	3/16	10	57.16°
Length (i)	7./32%	9 <i>[</i> 327	1,1/32
Overall & Langth	6.3 <i>[8</i> ,	100 f 80 /4:	048** 10-3/8



A desirable and dependable tool for service where center to center dimensions vary. Pins milled, surfaces smooth, hardened, black enameled.

EUGENE ERNST PRODUCTS CO. EEP®



BOX 427 FARMINGDALE, NEW JERSEY 07727-0427 PHONE: (Area Code 201) 938-5641

EEP/ SIGHT FLOW INDICATORS

CONSTRUCTION: Iron. Bronze, Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel


Round Glass Retaining Rings are made in Bronze as they do not come in contact with liquid for IRON, CARBON STEEL AND STAINLESS STEEL BODIES

PRESENT

PROPOSED

ROTATING TEFLON* WHEEL





WHEN ORDERING: SPECIFY THE EEP/MODEL NUMBER

*DuPont's Registered Trademark

AND CONSTRUCTION

	SIZES FOR	RABOVE	MODELS	
Pipe		DIMENSIONS		Approx.
Size	А	В	C	Weight
1/83/	31 -32 -	27 1 75	% 7/8 "	1-1/2#;
1/474.3	di3" "€		7/8"	1-1/2#7
3/8	372374	74.27 July	11.7/8"	·s 1-1/2#
17277 %	. 3/3/4/5%	2-3/4	X 1-1/4"	3#7''
3/4562	1233/A77	95.2-3/4 美	5. 1-1/4	3#%, 、 , ,
内はおいて	(144)/4%	243-1/2学体	Do-1-1/271	44 6
-1-174" X	点[5-]/245	41/27	2-3/8"~	34 m ide
£1.1/2.5	350/2以	W.4-1/2-33	技 《23/8文》。	
7-2711-3	₹ £26-1/4=4 ·	-余51/45天	*/: 2·7/8*·>	17.5

SCREWED ENDS

EEP 300-S Sight Flow indicators operate successfully in any position but are particularly adapted to pipe lines carrying dark opaque solutions where the motion of the wheel is easily detected. This model is equally adapted to transparent solutions and gases and is frequently installed where observation must be made from a distance.

> PRESSURE RATING - 150 PSIG FOR INSERTION INTO PIPE



Illustrates 2" size with flange type glass retaining covers

ADJUSTABLE FACE SPANNER

WRENCHES FOR REMOVING SIGHT FLOW RETAINER RINGS

MODEL NUMBER	482	483	484
Extreme : Capacity ,	2/2	73	.4
PIN SIZE.	3/16.	粉	'0.'. '57.16"
Length: 23	.7J32#	9/327	11/32
Overall 5, Length	沙尼斯 6-3/BI	超高。 8过74:	10-3/8



A desirable and dependable tool for service where center to center dimensions vary. Pins milled, surfaces smooth, hardened, black enameled.



05-10 -94 Date

Subject SO₂ Unloading

From M. D. Bayes

Department Heads

SO2 is scheduled to be unloaded at OKDO i ico: hours on S. N May 15 1941

If there are any conflicts with this schedule, please contact me. All department heads will be notified in the event a change in this schedule is necessary.

M.O. Bour

M. D. Bayes Plant Engineer

/bc

cc: M. H. Thomas/W. D. England N. J. Wilson/D. L. Mell

K. L. Borders

D. M. Duellman

T. L. Ohlinger

W. E. Maynard

B. Q. Bussey

M. Jackson

ATTACHMENT E

KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY BIG SANDY PLANT SO2 UNLOADING PROCEDURE

Procedures for employees with respect to work practices during the unloading of SO₂:

- Laboratory personnel shall notify all appropriate personnel of the date, time and unit location of SO₂ unloading.
- 2. Human Resources shall notify plant security of the date and time of scheduled SO₂ unloading so notices may be posted at the guardhouse advising plant personnel.
- 3. Work shall be prohibited in confined spaces unless immediate egress is possible. This applies to outage and non-outage.
- 4. Work should normally be restricted in the Unit 1 condenser pits, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ash hopper pits, the plant stack and the Unit 2 F.D. fan areas while they are in operation.
- 5. Should work be required in restricted areas, the necessary precautions shall be taken.

SO2 UNLOADING PROCEDURES

SAPETY EQUIPMENT

The following safety equipment is to be used for unloading SO2:

- 1) Two self-contained breathing apparatuses.
- 2) Chemically resistant rain-suit (one per operator).
- 3) Full-face respirator with appropriate SO₂ cartridges (one per operator).
- 4) Rubber gloves (one pair per operator).
- 5) Hard hat (one per operator).
- 6) Approved safety glasses (one pair per operator).
- 7) Face shield (one per operator) optional.
- 8) If boots are worn due to inclement weather, it is desirable that trouser legs fit "over" the tops of the boots in order to shed spills of liquid SO₂.

TOOLS

- 1) Two pipe wrenches.
- 2) One tank car valve wrench.
- 3) One adjustable crescent wrench.
- 4) One channel lock wrench.

PLUMBING/FITTINGS

1) Flexible stainless steel hoses with associated couplings and safety valves.

CHEMICALS

- 1) Ammonia solution, preferably in plastic wash bottle with spray tube, for leak detection.
- Caustic soda, lime, or soda ash solution for venting, as necessary.

PRE-HOOKUP PROCEDURE

- 1) Close gates around SO₂ truck to prevent vehicle traffic from entering unloading area.
- Insure proper operation of eye-wash and safety shower located just inside the southeast door of Unit 1 building.
- 3) Barricade the southeast door exit (on the inside) to prevent pedistrian traffic from entering unloading area. Do not block access to the safety shower and eye-wash when barricading the exit.
- 4) Insure that doorways, especially roll-up doors, remain closed during SO₂ unloading.

HOOK-UP_PROCEDURE

- 1) Unloading operations will be performed by two persons properly instructed and made responsible for compliance with all safety regulations.
- 2) Inspect and perform check-out procedure on the self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA). SCBA's should be readily available (with boxes open) for quick access in case of an emergency. Air tanks should have a minimum of 2000 psi.
- 3) Remove unloading equipment from the SO2 control building.
- 4) Put on chemically resistant rainsuits, gloves, and full-face respirator.
- 5) Insure that liquid and vapor hand-operated shutoff valves (HOSV's) in transfer lines (at tank pad) are closed, then remove end-caps from stationary transfer piping.
- 6) Connect liquid and vapor safety valve air lines to the permanent air supply on tank pad and to safety valves on flexible hoses.

 Open air supply valves.
- 6) Connect flexible liquid and vapor unloading hoses to stationary transfer piping and to truck. If O-ring seated couplings are used, make sure O-rings are in place before connecting.
- 8) Place liquid and vapor safety valve electrical plugs in respective outlet behind the pad junction box, and into the electrical connections of the safety valves on the flexible hoses.
- 9) Open the ball valve to pressure gauge in vapor line (if closed).
- 10) Open both liquid tank car valves on top of SO2 tank.

- 11) Open vapor tank car valve if closed.
- 12) Open tank car valve and HOSV at top of tank sight glass.

 Tank car valve should be open fully to insure proper operation of valve.
- 13) Slowly open tank car valve and HOSV at bottom of tank sight glass and inspect for leaks. If no leaks are detected, open tank car valve fully to insure proper operation of valve.
- 14) Open air operated liquid and vapor safety valves using switches on the SO₂ unloading control cabinet located on the north side of the SO₂ building.
- 15) Slowly open vapor HOSV's on the stationary transfer piping. Check for leaks. If leaks appear, repair as necessary.
- 16) Slowly open liquid HOSV's on the stationary transfer piping. Check for leaks. If leaks appear, repair as necessary.
- 17) Instruct driver to open the truck's vapor valve.
- 18) When sufficient pressure differential has been established, instruct driver to slowly open the truck's liquid valve.
- 19) Check all piping for leakage.
- 20) When SO₂ flow has stabilized, place the switches on the SO₂ unloading control cabinet to the "auto" position.
- 21) Test automatic safety valves for proper operation by pressing the "kill" switch on the control cabinet. All valves should close.
- 22) If safety valves operate properly, reopen safety valves by turning the switches to "hand" and then return switches to the "auto" position to insure proper operation of the emergency "kill" switch. If valves fail to operate properly, contact appropriate personnel to repair as necessary. Discontinue the unloading until the problem is resolved.
- 23) Notify both unit control rooms that SO₂ unloading is in progress. An announcement will be issued over the public address system.
- 24) Operators may now remove chemically resistant rain-suits if desired.
- 25) Monitor unloading by observing liquid rotameter, tank pressure gauge, sight glass level, and piping (for possible leakage).

TERMINATION OF TRANSFER

- 1) When vapor appears in the liquid rotameter, place switches on the SO₂ unloading control cabinet in the "hand" position.
- 2) Put on chemically resistant suits, gloves, and full-face respirator.
- 3) When all liquid has been purged from the liquid transfer line, instruct the driver to turn off the truck compressor. Close HOSV's on stationary liquid and vapor transfer piping.
- 4) If a second truck will be unloaded, close the automatic safety valves and allow the driver to vent the truck piping. When venting is complete, disconnect the flexible hoses and connect them to the second truck. Repeat steps 15 through 25 above.
- 5) If no further unloading is required and all liquid has been purged from the liquid transfer piping, instruct driver to turn off the truck compressor. Close HOSV's on the stationary liquid and vapor transfer piping.
- 6) Before closing the automatic safety valves, allow driver to vent the flexible hoses and truck piping. When venting is complete, close automatic safety valves.
- 7) Disconnect unloading piping, place protective end-caps on the stationary transfer piping, and return equipment to the SO2 control building.
- 8) Close the storage tank sight glass valves and both liquid tank car valves.
- 9) Notify both unit control rooms that unloading is complete. An announcement of completion of SO₂ unloading will be issued over the public address system.
- 10) Remove the SO₂ personal protective equipment, properly clean and disinfect SCBS's and full-face respirators, and store equipment in designated storage cabinet.
- 11) Send SO₂ shipping papers to the storeroom.

ATTACHMENT F

SO₂ SUPPLIER

Coulton Chemical Corp. 6600 Sylvania Avenue Sylvania, OH 43560

(419) 885-4661 Contact Person: Cheryl Jamnisk

Drivers: Garry Stewart Gene Haase

ATTACHMENT G

Listing of specific job orders for SO₂ liquid flow indicator from January 1, 1993 to May 16, 1994.

March 23, 1994

Big Sandy Job Order No. 0296041

Equipment No. 5512529110

Equipment Description: SO₂ Unloading System Unit 1

Requested by: T. J. Rust - Plant Engineer I

Work Description: SO₂ Liquid flow meter - Leak in and around meter.

Repair, this is in the rotameter on Unit 1 tank.

August 27, 1993

Big Sandy Job Order No. 0169772

Equipment No. 551259110

Equipment Description: SO₂ Unloading System Unit 1

Requested by: J. L. Skaggs - Performance Technician Sr.

Work Description: SO₂ unloading station - replace gaskets on flow indicator as it is leaking on both sides.

Note: SO2 unloading was performed on the following dates:

March 30, 1994 April 15, 1994 April 26, 1994 May 15, 1994 Operator SURVEY UNIT ONE

FREQUENCY 1=ONCE PER SHIFT 2=TWICE PER SHIFT A=AS NEEDED HEASUN
REPREQUIRED
R=ROUTINE
O=OTHER

V=VISUAL P=PHYSICAL

					SPECIFIC ITEMS CHECKED
E :	EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION	_	_		LKS LEAKS S=SAFETY EQUIP
L į		F	R		LE=LEVEL G=GAGES PU=PUMP
E		R	E		
V		E	Α		TH=THRUST V=VIBRATION
A		0	S		C=CLINKERS T=TEMPERATURE
т		U	0	E	F=FLOW M=MOTOR CH=CHARTS
1		E	Ν		L=LUBRICATION GB=GEAR BOXE
0		N	S		A=ABNORMALITIES N=NORMAL
N		C			P=POSITION
<u> </u>		Υ			
	BOTTOM ASH HOPPER AND PIPING	2			LKS,LE,G,P,T,M,L,A,N,C,F
	EXHAUST HOOD ATTEMPORATOR	2	R	V.P	LKS,A,N,G
	BFP INJECTION WATER VALVE	2	R		LKS,A,N,P
	COMBUSTION AIR HEATING SYSTEM	2	R	V,P	LKS,LE,V,PU,T,M,TH,L,A,N,P,F
	CIRCULATING WATER VALVES & PIPING	2			LKS,A,N,P
7	GENERATOR GROUND TRANSFORMER	2	R	V,P	LKS,A.N
569	TRANSFORMERS EAST, WEST 1AB	2	R	V,P	LKS,LE,G,T,F,M,A,N,P
OUT/	COOLING TOWER & PIPING	2	R	V,P	LKS,LE,F,A,N
SIDE	CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS - 2	! 2	R	V,P	LKS,V,PU,T,M,L,A,N,P,F
	CHLORING BUILDING	2	: R	V.P	LKS,G,V,PU,TH.T.F.M.L.A.N.P
	COMBUSTION AIR COILS	2	R	V.P	LKS,LE,V,P,T,M,TH,L,A,N
· 	CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK	2	i R	V,P	LKS,A,N
- 	SULFURIC ACID TANK	2	R	V,P	LKS,LE,PU,F,M,T,L,A,N,P
	AMP TANK & PIPING	2	R	V.P	LKS,LE,PU,F,M,T,L,A,N
1	SO2 TANK & PIPING	2			LKS,LE,PU,F,M,T,L,A,N,P
+	SO3 BUILDING & PIPING	2			LKS,G,T,F,M,V,L,A,P,N
	TURBINE ROOM SUMP PIPING	2		_	LKS.P
	CIRCULATING WATER SUMP	2	R		LKS,V,PU,T,F,M,A,N,P,LE
	DIESEL FIRE PUMP FUEL TANK	2	В	+	LE,LKS,A,N
	FIRE PUMPS EAST, MIDDLE, WEST	1 2	R		LKS,S,G,V,PU,TH,T,F,M,L,A,N,P
	FLUME MAKE UP VALVE & LEVEL CONTROL	2	-		LKS.G.V.P.F.A.N.P
		2	+		LKS,PU,M,L,A,N,G,P,S
	BRINE PIT AND PUMPS-2	2		_	LKS,G,PU,M,L,A.N,P
	FUEL OIL PUMPS NORTH, SOUTH	2			LKS,N,A,P
	BOTTOM ASH PIPING	2			LKS,G,V,PU,TH,T,M,L,A,N,P
<u>553 </u>	MISC DRAIN TANK PUMPS & LEVEL CONTROL				LKS,G,V,PU,TH,T,M,L,A,N,P
	COOLING WATER PUMPS-2				LKS,G,V,PU,TH,T,M,L,A,N,P
	LOW PRESSURE SERVICE PUMPS-3	2	-	1	···
	COOLING WATER COOLER		ļ R	-	LKS,G,T,A,N,P,F
<u>i</u>	CONDENSER PIT PIPING		F	$\overline{}$	PILKS,A,N,P
	PASSENGER ELEVATOR SUMP	2			P LE.A.N
	FREIGHT ELEVATOR SUMP	_ 2			P LE.A.N
1	COOLING TOWER BLOW DOWN VALVE	2	_		P LKS,A,N,P
<u>. i</u>	CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP	2	: F		LKS,V,PU,M,L,A,N,P
	BFP AUX SEAL WATER BOOSTER PUMP		2 F	\rightarrow	> ILKS,M,L,A,N,P,T.TH
Ī	FLASH EVAPORATOR RECIRCULATE PUMPS-2	2	<u> </u>	\ <u> ∨.</u>	P LKS,M.L.A.N.P

BIG SANDY GAS CONDITIONING SYSTEM

SHIFT LOG - UNIT 1

Actual Operating Conditions

		Mon.			Tue	es.	Wed.			Thurs.			Fri.			Sat.			Sun.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(2)			(2)			(2)			(2)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
DATE: 5/2/94 -5/9/94				5	5/3		5/:/	5/4			3/6		5/	5/6	4	rit 1	111	KEN	1 0	1T -	. سره
TIME:	0100	1700		313	1256		0476	100			1230		<u> در دو</u>	1100		ERU	ICE	Ţ	7-6	-94	<u> </u>
UNIT LOAD:	270	272		270	370	<u> </u>	2",1	250		11:14	<u> </u>		360	<u> 265</u>							<u> </u>
PARAMETERS	1-1			D	c		o	ے		į,	C.			Q							
1. SO ₂ Flow Mode (Auto or Manual)	M	14		111	m		m	m		177	M		М	m							
2. Tank Pad Pressure, psig	66	85		4.7	83		82	82		ابخ	85		85								
3. Tank Gage Level (By Performance Dept.)	6.,									-											
4. SO ₂ Inlet Pressure, psig	19	19		20	30		20	10		20	17		19	26							
5. SO ₂ Flow, Lb/Hr.																					
6. Rotometer, GPM	- 055	055		,055	, 5 5/		.05%	055		3 * *	.650		, 293	058							
7. Vaporizer Discharge Pressure, psig	19	20		14	18		16	18		10	18		18	18							
8. Vaporizer Discharge Temperature, °F	76	10		56	55			50		57	67		53	Sb							
9. Vaporizer Set Temp. °F:																					
<u> </u>	0	9	<u> </u>	4	0		9	0		-	0		0	9							· ·
#2		\coprod			Щ.						_										
ZONE #3	- - -	/_	<u> </u>	-	Ц.	<u> </u>		Щ	 			<u> </u>	igsqcut								
#4		<u> </u>		1			Ļ	Ц.				ļ				 					
#5		<u>'</u>		U		;) _	Ш		•			<u> </u>							.	l

BIG SANDY GAS CONDITIONING SYSTEM SHIFT LOG - UNIT 2 ACTUAL OPERATING CONDITIONS

	МO	N /	THE	25	WEI	n .	TITI	og:	ED.	7	~ `	_		
DATE MAY 9 1994	79	74	3/0	2/10	15//1	5/11	5/11	17/2	5/1	7/5	١١٦٨	3/4		# Jan
TIME	9930					1200	2200	130c			05	2/030	OUT-	F-512
UNIT LOAD	1720	(40	682	672	725	720	215	735	740		<u> </u>	590	52	WAR
SHIFT	13	TT-	_ د	H.	2	A	<u></u>	LA_	D	P	D	\subseteq		
1.50 ₂ Flow Mode	1	_	12	1/,	1 1	,	1	1	,	1/	۱.	,		
Remote- Local- Manual	10	 	├─	14	<u> </u>	-	<u></u>	 	4	<u>د ۲</u>	/-	_		
2.Tank Pad Press, psig	78	184	80	92	79	84	84	84	78	78	73	80		
			•	-			,			-4	1.			
3.SO ₂ Inlet Press, psiq	78	86	8 .	127	XI.	87	95	86	80	81	76	82		
4 SO Flow Population of	30	177	28	سبر ا	24	7.7		31	2	31	101	3/		
4.SO ₂ Flow Recorder %								}+-	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 		12.			
5.Rotometer, GPM	36	45	.42	1.44	136	44	.4	41	รว	28	1 20	4		
	<u> </u>	_		 	-						:	'-'-		
6.Vaporizer Discharge			$ \cdot_{i} $	//	:		}	١, _	_			, ,		
Pressure Psig	9	13	; 1	//	10	13	15	12	9	//	9	//		
7 10-0-07	-													
7. Vaporizer Disch. Temp.	1/2-	110		15	1115	٠	م ۾	1	مدا	1,,	, ,	111		
OF (Local Thermometer)	<u> </u>	40		(3)	40	240	40	7/2	20	1250	40	70	· .	!
8.Blower; a.Filter Diff.Press	100	5	25	7.5	7	3	2	2.5	7 _	25	س ما	2 <		i
b.Disc. Press.psiq		7.5		35	X	8	8	0	8	 	5.2	9		——-
c.Disc. Temp. of		200			<i>เ</i> าร			200		HO	110	185	•	
d.Oil Level	17	レ	1			ル	· -	7		1	7	1		 }
		700		_						_				
9.Bed One Inlet Temp. (401)	775	/99	<u>723 </u>	712	782	761	727	797	78 L	76	777	795	{	
10. Bed One Outlet Temp. (402)	2-4	ko7	555		3811	Eni		.		_ ,	A	018		
10. Eed One Outlet Temp. (402)	18 08	104 .	7	222	107	001	709	801	785	27.5	<i>141</i>	0 - 0		
ll.Bed Two Inlet Temp. (403)	GUE	1976	•	415	877	969	CAN	91.5	አ ድ ፣	VU	09)	960	- 1	1
j	1 -		1	i										
12.Bed Two Outlet Temp. / (404)	928	1982	1977	981	93/	975	962	973	926	134	907	949	•	
•	1													
13.North Lance Temp. (405)	643	/13	(ه/	727	697	706	713	709	688	72	643	69/		
	ı			•	I I			i		i		1 1	j	
14. South Lance Temp. (406)	1770	802	•	71.7	115	173	790	ر79	76 ₂)	174	75-6	<u> </u>		
15.Air Heater Case Temp. (409)	1	117/											- 1	
	1164	טעיין		1166	1136	1121	ارس دا	1101	1152		11216	1/43		
5.Air Heater Case Temp. (409)					رحرت		//34	11612	(1.2.)	<i>P. II</i>	,,,,	,,,,,,		
16.SO ₂ Vapor Temp. (414)	36	44	3	4	77	43	40	441	37	42	37	41	j	
				40	34,	35/	7.5	32	30			33/		
7.SO ₂ Flow Peak To Peak	12	أستجة			1 / 1	7	34/				- <i>F</i>	'	- 1	
Fluctuation %	31	8		ે ^ર	123	33	/25	3)	<u> ২০</u>]	<u></u>	Z11	28		
19 To CO . Dun- 7 (C				,										
18. Is SO ₂ Pump I/S	Ain	امدا	20	<u> </u>	<i>\\</i> 13	11/17	,	Δ/	۸۱۸	ر) ا	44	11/2		j
Yes or No	עט	NC				w								
# 6 FUEL O: TANK LOVE	194	1	194	194"	19'01	194	1911	19:5	2	94	14	1194		
W VEL VILLIAM LEVE			. /	7 1	. , 7	1 2 11	17 7	1 14	1/1/	47	111	7741		